In this note I compare different Voting systems. We have:

  • Properties: A usually desired property that a voting system might or might not have
  • Voting System: A way to make votes to a single winner. A vote is usually a choice of favourite candidates, rank of candidates, or a weighted list of candidate preferences

Properties

  • 🔵 Condorcet compliance: If a candidate wins all head to head comparisons, then this candidate is declared the winner. This cannot be satisfied in non-ranking systems, as they do not provide a way to do head to head comparisons.
  • 🟠 Unrestricted Domain: The voting system always produces a winner, no matter the votes submitted
  • 🔴 Non-dictatorship: The voting system is not a function of a single voter
  • 🟢 Non-imposition: It is always possible for any candidate to win
  • 🟣 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The relative outcome between two candidates and should not change when voters only change their preferences regarding a third candidate (including adding or removing from the ballot).
  • 🟡 No-split votes: Voters never benefit from ranking or rating a more likely candidate above their true favourite. This is the favourite betrayal criterion.

Remark: Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that for three or more candidates, no rule that aggregates ranked ballots into a ranking satisfies unrestricted domain 🟠, non-dictatorship 🔴, independence of irrelevant alternatives 🟣 and the Pareto principle (if every voter prefers to , so does the outcome) together. Arrow’s original 1951 version used non-imposition 🟢 together with monotonicity in place of the Pareto principle. The theorem applies to ranked ballots only; rated systems such as Approval and score voting escape it, since they use more information than the rankings.

Remark: the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every deterministic ranked voting rule with three or more possible winners, all of which can win, is either dictatorial or open to strategic voting for some profile. No reasonable system is fully strategy-proof; 🟡 only rules out the specific strategy of betraying one’s favourite.

Voting Systems

The colours below represent which properties, described above, are satisfied by each system. ⚫️ is used as a placeholder for when a property is not satisfied. Ties are assumed broken by a fixed rule, so every system below produces a winner 🟠, is non-dictatorial 🔴 and lets any candidate win 🟢.

  1. ⚫️🟠🔴🟢🟣🟡 Approval: Each voter approves or disapproves each candidate. Highest approval wins. 🟣 holds if each voter keeps their approvals of and fixed; voters who set an approval threshold relative to the field may move it when enters, so the guarantee is at the level of ballots rather than of preferences.
  2. ⚫️🟠🔴🟢⚫️⚫️ Borda: Add up the rank numbers. Whoever has the lowest score, wins. Borda is not Condorcet compliant: with 3 voters ranking and 2 ranking , beats head to head 3 to 2, but wins with 8 points against 9 for (and 13 for ). Burying a strong rival at the bottom of the ballot can pay off, so 🟡 fails.
  3. ⚫️🟠🔴🟢⚫️⚫️ First Past the Post: Whoever has the most #1 votes wins. Spoilers violate 🟣, and voting for the front-runner over a hopeless favourite pays off, violating 🟡.
  4. ⚫️🟠🔴🟢⚫️⚫️ Instant Runoff Voting: Count up the #1 choices. If someone has a strict majority of the ballots still in the count, they win. If not, eliminate the last-place candidate and transfer those ballots to their next remaining choice. Repeat until someone has a majority. A Condorcet winner with few first preferences can be eliminated early (centre squeeze), so 🔵 fails; adding or removing a losing candidate can change the elimination order and the winner, so 🟣 fails; and a voter whose favourite is eliminated late can sometimes help their second choice by ranking it first, so 🟡 fails.
  5. ⚫️🟠🔴🟢🟣🟡 Score voting: Each voter rates each candidate on a fixed scale, for example 0 to 9. Highest total wins. Approval is the special case of a two-point scale, and the same caveat on 🟣 applies.
  6. ⚫️🟠🔴🟢⚫️⚫️ Two-round system: If nobody has a majority of #1 votes, the top two face a runoff. It fails 🔵, 🟣 and 🟡 for the same reasons as Instant Runoff Voting.
  7. 🔵🟠🔴🟢⚫️⚫️ Condorcet methods (Copeland, Schulze, ranked pairs): Elect the candidate who wins all head to head comparisons, and resolve cycles ( beats , beats , beats ) by a rule specific to each method. Every Condorcet compliant method fails 🟣: in a cycle, whichever candidate wins, removing the candidate it loses to would leave a different Condorcet winner. They also fail 🟡.

Sources